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It is widely believed that the brain performs approximate probabilistic inference to estimate causal variables in 
the world from ambiguous sensory data. To understand these computations, we need to analyze how 
information is represented and transformed by the actions of nonlinear recurrent neural networks. We 
propose that these probabilistic computations function by a message-passing algorithm operating at the level 
of redundant neural populations. To explain this framework, we review its underlying concepts, including 
graphical models, sufficient statistics, and message-passing, and then describe how these concepts could be 
implemented by recurrently connected probabilistic population codes. The relevant information flow in these 
networks will be most interpretable at the population level, particularly for redundant neural codes. We 
therefore outline a general approach to identify the essential features of a neural message-passing algorithm. 
Finally, we argue that to reveal the most important aspects of these neural computations, we must study large-
scale activity patterns during moderately complex, naturalistic behaviors.
INTRODUCTION
Perception as inference
In its purest form, probabilistic inference is the ‘right’ way to 
solve problems (Laplace 1812). While animal brains face 
various constraints and cannot always solve problems in the 
smartest possible way, many human and animal behaviors do 
provide strong evidence of probabilistic computation. The idea 
that the brain performs statistical inference harkens back at 
least to Helmholtz (1925) and has been elaborated by many 
others. According to this hypothesis, the goal of sensory 
processing is to identify properties of the world based on 
ambiguous sensory evidence. Since the true properties cannot 
be determined with perfect confidence, there is a probability 
distribution associated with different interpretations, and 
animals weigh these probabilities when choosing actions. It is 
widely accepted that the brain somehow approximates 
probabilistic inference. But how does the brain do it?
To understand the neural basis of the brain’s probabilistic 
computations, we need to understand the overlapping 
processes of encoding, recoding, and decoding. Encoding 
describes the relationship between sensory stimuli and neural 
act ivi ty patterns. Recoding describes the dynamic 
transformation of those patterns into other patterns. Decoding 
describes the use of neural activity to generate actions.
In this paper we speculate how these processes might 
work, and what can be done to test it. Our model is consistent 
with the widely embraced principle that the brain performs 
probabilistic inference, but we offer a hypothesis about how 
those computations could appear within dynamic, recurrently 
connected probabilistic population codes to implement a class 
of algorithms called message-passing algorithms. This way of 
thinking about neural representations allows one to connect the 
computations operating on interpretable world variables to the 
computations operating on neural activations. The connection 
between these levels is made by summary statistics, which are 
functions of the neural data that encode the parameters of the 
inference algorithm. It is these summary statistics that we 
describe in the title as flowing through the brain. To explain this 
model, we review and connect some foundational ideas from 
statistics, probabilistic models, message-passing, and 
population codes.
We argue that to reveal the structure of these computations, 
we must study large-scale activity patterns in the brains of 
animals performing naturalistic tasks of greater complexity than 
most current neuroscience efforts. We also emphasize that 
since there are many equivalent ways for the brain to 
implement natural computations (Marder and Taylor 2011), one 
can understand them best at the representational level (Marr 
1982) — characterizing how statistics encoding task variables 
are transformed by neural computations — rather than by fine 
details of how the large-scale neural activity patterns are 
transformed.
A critique of simple tasks
Neuroscience has learned an enormous amount in the past 
several decades using a simple kind of tasks, such as those in 
which subjects choose between two options — two-alternative 
forced-choice tasks (2AFC). Many experiments found individual 
neurons that were tuned to task stimuli with enough reliability 
that only a small handful could be averaged together to perform 
as well or better than the animal in a 2AFC task (Newsome et 
al. 1989; Cohen & Newsome 2009; Gu et al. 2008; Chen et al. 
2013a). With a brain full of neurons, why isn’t behavior better? 
One possible answer is that responses to a fixed stimulus are 
correlated. These covariations cannot be averaged away by 
pooling, limiting the information the animal has about the world 
and creating a redundant neural code (Zohary et al. 1994, 
Moreno-Bote et al. 2014). Individual neural responses also 
correlate with reported percepts, even when the stimulus itself 
is perfectly ambiguous. This has been reported in multiple tasks 
and cortical areas (Britten et al. 1996; Uka & DeAngelis 2004; 
Nienborg & Cumming 2007; Gu et al. 2008; Fetsch et al. 2011; 
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Chen et al. 2013a,b,c; Liu et al. 2013a,b). How much of these 
correlations arise from feedforward sensory noise versus 
feedback remains unresolved, in part because the tasks in 
which they are measured do not readily distinguish the two. 
This is one example of how simple tasks can create problems.
The most fundamental problem is that simple tasks limit the 
computations and neural activity to a domain where the true 
power and adaptability of the brain is hidden. When the tasks 
are low-dimensional, the mean neural population dynamics are 
bound to a low-dimensional subspace, and measured mean 
neural activity seems to hit this bound (Gao and Ganguli 2015). 
This means that the low-dimensional signals observed in the 
brain may be an artifact of overly simple tasks. Even worse, 
many of our standard tasks are linearly solvable using trivial 
transformations of sense data. And if  natural tasks could be 
solved with linear computation, then we wouldn’t even need a 
brain. We could just wire our sensors to our muscles and 
accomplish the same goal, because multiple linear 
processing  steps  is equivalent to a  single linear processing 
step. Distinguishing these steps becomes difficult at best, and 
uninterpretable at worst.
Finally, principles that govern neural computation in 
overtrained animals performing unnatural lab tasks may not 
generalize. Are we learning about the real brain in action, or a 
laboratory artifact? Evolution did not optimize brains for 2AFC 
tasks, and the real benefit of complex inferences like weighing 
uncertainty may not be apparent unless the uncertainty has 
complex structure. How can we understand how the brain 
works without challenging it with tasks like those for which it 
evolved? We return to the question of task design later, after 
we have introduced our computational model for probabilistic 
inference that we want to test.
ALGORITHM OF THE BRAIN
In perception, the quantities of interest — the things we can 
act upon — cannot be directly observed through our senses. 
These unobservable quantities are called latent or hidden 
variables. For example, when we reach for a mug, we never 
directly sense the object’s three-dimensional shape — that is 
latent — but only images of reflected light and increased tactile 
pressure in some hand positions. Some latent quantities are 
relevant to behavioral goals, like the handle’s orientation, while 
other latent variables are a nuisance, like shadows of other 
objects. Perception is hard because both types of latent 
variables affect sensory observations, and we must disentangle 
nuisance variables from our sense data to isolate the task-
relevant ones (DiCarlo and Cox 2007).
We must infer all of this based on uncertain sensory 
evidence. There are multiple sources of uncertainty. Some is 
intrinsic to physics: lossy observations due to occlusion or 
photon shot noise. Some is unresolvable variation, like the hum 
of a city street. Other uncertainty is due to biology, including 
neural noise and limited sampling by the sensors and 
subsequent computation. Uncertainty also arises from 
suboptimal processing (Beck et al. 2012): model mismatch 
behaves much like structured noise. Regardless of its origin, 
since uncertainty is an inevitable property of perceptual 
systems, it is valuable to process signals in accordance with 
probabilistic reasoning.
Unfortunately, exact probabilistic inference is intractable for 
models that are as complex as the ones our brains seem to 
make. First, merely representing arbitrary joint probabilities 
exactly requires enormous resources, exponential in the 
number of variables. Second, performing inference over these 
distributions requires an exponentially large number of 
operations. This means that exact inference in arbitrary models 
is out of the question, for the brain or any other type of 
computer. Finally, even exploiting the structure in the natural 
world, a lifetime of experience never really has enough data to 
constrain a complete statistical model, nor do we have enough 
computational power and time to perform statistical inference 
based on these ideal statistics. Our brain must invoke the 
‘blessing of abstraction’ (Goodman et al. 2009) to overcome 
this ‘curse of dimensionality’ (Bellman 1957). The brain must 
make assumptions about the world that limit what it can usefully 
represent, manipulate and learn — this is the ‘no free lunch 
theorem’ (Wolpert 1996).
In the next sections, we describe our neural model for 
encoding structured probabilities, and recoding or transforming 
them during inferences used to select actions.
Encoding: Redundant distributed representations of 
probabilistic graphical models
Since the probability distribution over things in the world is 
hugely complex, we hypothesize that the brain simplifies the 
world by assuming that not every variable necessarily interacts 
with all other variables. Instead, there may be a small number 
of important interactions. Variables and their interactions can be 
elegantly visualized as a sparsely connected graph (Figure 1A), 
and described mathematically as a probabilistic graphical 
model (Koller and Friedman 2009). These are representations 
of complex probability distributions as products of lower-
dimensional functions (see Box). Such constraints on possible 
distributions are appropriate for the natural world, which has 
both hierarchical and local structures.
Knowledge about the world is embodied in these 
interactions between variables. Many of the most important 
ones express nonlinear relationships between variables. For 
example, unlike pervasive models of sparse image coding 
(Olshausen and Field 1997), natural images are not generated 
as a simple linear sum of features. Instead many properties of 
natural images arise from occlusion (Pitkow 2010) and the 
multiplicative absorption of light (Wainwright and Simoncelli 
2000).
How might these probabilistic graphical models be 
represented by neural activity? Information about each sensory 
variable is spread across spiking activity of many neurons with 
similar stimulus sensitivities. Conversely, neurons are also 
tuned to many different features of the world (Rigotti et al. 
2013). Together, these facts mean that the brain uses a 
distributed and multiplexed code.
There are several competing models of how neural 
populations encode probabilities, with different advantages and 
disadvantages, and accounting for different aspects of 
experimental observations. In temporal representations of 
uncertainty, like the ‘sampling hypothesis,’ instantaneous neural 
activity represents a single interpretation, without uncertainty, 
and probabilities are reflected by the set of interpretations over 
time (Hoyer and Hyvärinen 2003; Berkes et al. 2011; Moreno-
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Bote et al. 2011; Buesing et al. 2011; Haefner et al. 2016; 
Orbán et al. 2016).
Here we focus on spatial representations of probability. 
According to these models, the spatial pattern of neural activity 
across a population of neurons implicitly encodes a probability 
distribution (Ma et al. 2006; Jazayeri and Movshon 2006; Savin 
and Denève 2014; Rao 2004; Hoyer and Hyvarinen 2003). We 
consider, specifically, a multivariate elaboration of probabilistic 
population codes (PPCs, Ma et al. 2006). In a simple example, 
the population vector encodes the best point estimate of a 
stimulus variable, and the total spike count in a population can 
reflect the overall confidence about the variables of interest (Ma 
et al. 2006). More generally, every neural spike adds log-
probability to some interpretations of a scene, so more spikes 
typically means more confidence. This class of models has 
been used successfully to explain the brain’s representation of 
uncertainty (Ma et al. 2006; Jazayeri and Movshon 2006), 
evidence integration over time (Beck et al. 2008), multimodal 
sensory integration (Fetsch et al. 2012), and marginalization 
(Beck et al. 2011).
Past work has critiqued this approach as generally requiring 
an inordinate number of neurons (Fiser et al. 2010). If one 
wanted to represent a univariate probability with a resolution 
around 1/10 of the full variable range, one would need 10 
neurons. But to represent an arbitrary joint probability 
distribution over a mere 100 variables to the same resolution 
along each dimension, this number explodes to 10100 neurons, 
more than the number of particles in the visible universe.
Thankfully, the brain does not have to represent arbitrary 
probabilities in an unstructured world. By modeling the structure 
of the world using probabilistic graphical models, the required 
resources can be diminished enormously, requiring only 
enough neurons to describe the variables’ direct interactions 
(see Box, Figure 1A) with the desired precision. To represent a 
joint distribution over the same 100 variables with sparse direct 
pairwise interactions (10% of possible pairs), we only need a 
reasonable 104 neurons, saving an impressive 96 orders of 
magnitude. How the brain learns good models is a fundamental 
open question, but one we do not address here. Instead we 
consider the computations that the brain could perform using 
an internal model that has already been constructed.
We therefore hypothesize that the brain represents 
posterior probabilities by a probabilistic graphical model, 
implemented in a multivariate probabilistic population code. In 
this model, estimates and uncertainties about both individual 
latent variables and groups of variables are represented as 
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Figure 1. Inference in graphical models embedded in 
neural activity.
A. A probabilistic graphical model compactly represents direct 
relationships (statistical interactions or conditional dependencies, see 
Box) amongst many variables. This can be depicted as a factor graph, 
with circles showing variables x and squares showing interactions ψ 
between subsets of variables. Three variable nodes (red, green, blue) 
and two interaction factors (brown) are highlighted. Observed 
variables are shaded gray. B. Illustration of our message-passing 
neural inference model. Neural activity resides in a high-dimensional 
space r (top). Distinct statistics Ti(r) reflect the strength of certain 
patterns within the neural activity (red, green, and blue uniformly 
colored activation patterns). These statistics serve as estimators of 
parameters θi, such as the mode or inverse covariance, for the brain’s 
approximate posterior probabilities over latent variables (colored 
probability distributions). As neuronal activities evolve over time, the 
specific patterns that serve as summary statistics are updated as well. 
We hypothesize that the resultant recoding dynamics obey a 
canonical message-passing equation that has the same form for all 
interacting variables. This generic equation updates the posterior 
parameters at time t according to θi(t+1) = M [θi(t), θNi(t) ; ψ, G], where 
M represents a family of message-passing functions, θNi represents all 
parameters in the the set of neighbors Ni on the graphical model that 
interact with θi, the factors ψ determine the particular interaction 
strengths between groups of variables, and G are global 
hyperparameters that specify one message-passing algorithm from 
within a given family. The message-passing parameter updates can 
be expressed equivalently in terms of the neural statistics since 
Ti(r,t)  ≈ θi(t). The statistics flow through the population codes as the 
neural activity evolves, thereby representing the dynamics of 
probabilistic inference on a graphical model.
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distinct but possibly overlapping spatial patterns of neural 
activity (Figure 1B, Raju and Pitkow 2016). These activity 
patterns serve as ‘summary statistics’ (see Box) that tell us 
about different properties or parameters of the posterior 
distribution.
Not every aspect of the neural responses will be a summary 
statistic encoding information about latent variables. The other 
aspects would count as irrelevant noise. In quantifying the 
neural code, we can then compress the neural responses, 
aiming to keep those aspects that are relevant to the brain’s 
posterior probability. If this compression happens to be 
lossless, then these summary statistics are called ‘sufficient 
statistics.’
This concept of statistics is similar to the familiar notions of 
time- or trial-averaged means and covariances, except they are 
potentially more general functions of neural activity and 
estimate a wider range of parameters about the posterior 
probabilities. They are more like a single-trial population 
average — in fact for a population of homogeneous poisson 
neurons with gaussian tuning curves, the population sum is 
proportional to the inverse variance of the posterior (more 
spikes, more certainty). For linear probabilistic population 
codes, the sufficient statistics are weighted averages of neural 
activity (Ma et al. 2006). More generally the statistics may be 
arbitrary nonlinear functions, depending on how the relevant 
latent variables influence the neurons being considered.
Collectively, these summary statistics are a dimensionality 
reduction that encodes the brain’s probabilistic knowledge. This 
reduction enables us to relate the transformations of neural 
activity to the transformations of the posterior probabilities 
during inference.
Recoding: nonlinear transformations
The brain does not simply encode information and leave it 
untouched. Instead, it recodes or transforms this information to 
make it more useful. It is crucial that this recoding is nonlinear, 
for two reasons: first, for isolating task-relevant latent variables, 
and second, for updating parameters for probabilistic inference.
In the first case, nonlinear computation is needed to extract 
task-relevant variables, because in natural tasks they are 
usually nonlinearly entangled with task-irrelevant ‘nuisance’ 
variables (DiCarlo and Cox 2007). This is true even when there 
is no uncertainty about the underlying variables. Figure 2A 
illustrates how nonlinear computations can allow subsequent 
linear computation to isolate task variables.
Ethological tasks typically require complex nonlinearities to 
untangle  task-relevant properties from nuisance variables. In 
principle, any untangling can be accomplished by a simple 
network with one layer of nonlinearities, since this architecture 
is a universal function approximator for both feedforward nets 
(Cybenko 1989; Hornik 1991) and recurrent nets (Schäfer and 
Zimmerman 2007). However, in practice this can be more 
easily accomplished by a ‘deep’ cascade of simpler nonlinear 
transformations. This may be because the parameters are 
easier to learn, because the hierarchical structure imposed by 
the deep model are better matched to natural inputs (Montúfar 
et al. 2014), because certain representations use brain 
resources more economically, or all of the above. Indeed, 
trained artificial deep neural networks have notable similarities 
with biological neural networks (Yamins et al. 2014).
To what extent are these nonlinear networks probabilistic? 
One can trivially interpret neural responses as encoding 
probabilities, because neuronal responses differ upon repeated 
presentations of the same stimulus, and according to Bayes’ 
Probabilistic inference and Population codes
Probabilistic inference: Drawing conclusions based 
on ambiguous observations. Typical inference 
problems include finding the marginal probability of 
a task-relevant variable, or finding the most 
probable explanation of observed data.
Probabilistic computation: Transformation of signals 
in a manner consistent with rules of probability and 
statistics, especially through appropriate sensitivity 
to uncertainty (Ma 2012).
Latent variables (also called hidden or causal 
variables): Quantities whose value cannot be 
d i rec t l y obse rved , ye t wh i ch de te rm ine 
observations. Latent variables may be relevant or 
irrelevant (nuisance), depending on the task. Latent 
variables are typically the target of inferences and 
actions.
Probabilistic graphical model: A decomposition of a 
probability distribution into a product of conditionally 
independent factors that each describe interactions 
between distinct subsets of variables. One useful 
such model is a factor graph (Figure 1A) that 
represents a structured probability distribution 
P(xα) = ∏α ψα(xα) where x=(x1,…,xn) is a vector of 
all variables and xα is a subset of variables that 
interact through the function, or factor, ψα(xα).
Statistical interaction: Dependency between two 
variables that cannot be explained by other 
observed covariates. These are often represented 
by squares in a factor graph. Statistical interactions 
may be generated by physical interactions in the 
world, or can arise due to some neglected latent 
variables.
Higher-order interaction: A nonlinear statistical 
interaction between variables. An especially 
interesting case is when three or more variables 
interact. This leads naturally to contextual gating, 
whereby one variable (the ‘context’) determines 
whether two others interact.
Parameters: Quantities θ i that determine a 
probability distribution. For example, the mean and 
variance determine a specific Gaussian distribution. 
Here we consider parameters of the posterior 
distribution over latent variables.
Statistic: A function Ti(r)  of observable data (e.g., for 
the brain, the neural activity r) that can be used to 
infer a parameter. If the statistic contains the same 
information about a parameter as all observations 
together, the statistic is called ‘sufficient’. For 
example, the total spike count 1.r in a model 
population could be a statistic reflecting the 
confidence (1/variance) about a latent variable. 
(Note for aficionados: frequentists use statistics to 
summarize the probability of observed data. We are 
using the Bayesian version, where the statistics 
describe the probability of latent variables that 
generated the data.)
Message-passing algorithm: An iterative sequence 
of computations that performs a global computation 
by operating locally on statistical information 
(‘messages’) conveyed exclusively along the edges 
of a probabilistic graphical model.
Population code: Representation of a sensory, 
motor, or latent variable by the collective activity of 
many neurons.
Probabilistic population code: A population code that 
represents a probability distribution. This requires at 
least two statistics, to encode at least two 
parameters, such as an estimate and uncertainty.
Information-limiting correlations (informally, ‘bad 
noise’): Covarying noise fluctuations in large 
populations that are indistinguishable from changes 
in the encoded variable. These arise when sensory 
signals are embedded in a higher-dimensional 
space, or when suboptimal upstream processing 
throws away extensive amounts of information. 
These noise correlations cannot be averaged away 
by adding more neurons (Moreno-Bote et al. 2014).
Redundancy: Identical information content in 
different signals. If two neuronal populations inherit 
the same limited information from an upstream 
source, then either population can be decoded 
separately, or the two can be averaged, and the 
result is the same.
Robustness: Insensitivity of outputs to variations in 
the network. A computation is robust whenever 
uncertainty added by suboptimal processing is 
much smaller than the intrinsic uncertainty caused 
by information-limiting noise.
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rule that means that any given neural 
response could arise from multiple 
different stimuli. But to actually use 
that encoding  of probability to 
per form in ference (exact ly or 
approximately), the brain's decisions 
must be influenced by uncertainty, 
such as placing less weight on less 
re l iable informat ion. Crucia l ly, 
reliability often varies over time, so 
good inferences and the brain 
computations that produce them 
should be sensitive to the current 
uncertainty, rather than merely the 
typical uncertainty (Ma 2012).
Using probabilistic relationships 
typically requires a second kind of 
nonlinear transformation, one that 
accounts not only for relations 
between latent variables, but also 
between parameters of the posteriors 
about them, or equivalently between 
the sufficient statistics of the neural 
responses. Some of these parameter 
updates can be linear: to accumulate 
information about a latent variable the 
brain can just count spikes over time 
(Beck et al. 2008). Others will be nonlinear even in simple 
cases. For example, in a gaussian graphical model, the latent 
variables themselves are linearly correlated; but even in this 
simple case, the parameters describing uncertainties about the 
variables require nonlinear updates during inference. This is 
because the inferred mean of one gaussian variable based on 
all available evidence is a complex function of the means and 
variances of other variables.
Neural recoding should thus account for nonlinear 
relationships both between latent variables and between 
posterior parameters reflecting uncertainties. These nonlinear 
computations should collectively approximate probabilistic 
inference.
Recurrent recoding: Inference by message-passing
Exact inference in probabilistic models is intractable except 
in rare special cases. Many algorithms for approximate 
inference in probabilistic graphical models are based on 
iteratively transmitting information about probability distributions 
along the graph of interactions. These algorithms go by the 
name of ‘message-passing’ algorithms, because the 
information they convey between nodes are described as 
messages. They are dynamical systems whose variables 
represent properties of a probability distribution. Message-
passing is a broad class of algorithms that includes belief 
propagation (Pearl 1988), expectation propagation (Minka 
2001), mean-field inference, and other types of variational 
inference (Wainwright and Jordan 2008). Even some forms of 
sampling (Geman and Geman 1984; Lee and Mumford 2003) 
can be viewed as message-passing algorithms with a 
stochastic component.
Each specific algorithm is defined by how incoming 
information is combined and how outgoing information is 
Figure 2. Nonlinearity and redundancy in neural 
computation
A: The task of separating yellow from blue dots cannot be 
accomplished by linear operations, because the task-relevant variable 
(color) is entangled with a nuisance variable (horizontal position). After 
embedding the data nonlinearly into a higher-dimensional space, the 
task-relevant variable becomes linearly separable. B: Signals from the 
sensory periphery have limited information content, illustrated here by 
a cartoon tiling of an abstract neural response space r = (r1,r2). Each 
square represents the resolution at which the responses can be 
reliably discriminated, up to a precision determined by noise (η'). 
When sensory signals are embedded into a higher-dimensional space 
r’ =  (r'1,r'2,r'3), the noise is transformed the same way as the signals. 
This produces a redundant population code with high-order 
correlations. C: Such a code is redundant, with many copies of the 
same information in different neural response dimensions. 
Consequently, there are many ways to accomplish a given nonlinear 
transformation of the encoded variable, and thus not all details about 
neural transformations (red) matter. For this reason it is advantageous 
to model the more abstract, representational level on which the 
nonlinearity affects the information content. Here, a basis of simple 
nonlinearities (e.g. polynomials, bluish) can be a convenient 
representation for these latent variables, and the relative weighting of 
different coarse types of nonlinearities may be more revealing than 
fine details as long as the different readouts of fine-scale are 
dominated by information-limiting noise. D: A simple example showing 
that the brain needs nonlinear computation due to nuisance variation. 
Linear computation can discriminate angles x1 of Gabor images I of a 
fixed polarity x2=±1, because the nuisance-conditional mean of the 
linear function r=w.I is tuned to angle (red). If the polarity is unknown, 
however, the mean is not tuned (black). Tuning is recovered in the 
variance (blue), since the two polarities cause large amplitudes (plus 
and minus) for some angles. Quadratic statistics T(r)=r2 therefore 
encode the latent variable x1. E: A quadratic transformation r2 can be 
produced by the sum of several rectified linear functions [.]+ with 
uniformly spaced thresholds T.
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selected. To be a well-defined message-passing algorithm, 
these operations must be the same, irrespective of what kinds 
of latent variables are being inferred, or how strongly they 
interact in the underlying probabilistic graphical model.
Differences between algorithms reflect different choices of 
local approximations for intractable global computations. For 
instance, in belief propagation, each operation treats all 
incoming evidence as independent, even if it is not. Some 
randomness may be useful to represent and compute with 
distributions (Hinton and Sejnowski 1983; Hoyer and Hyvärinen 
2003) as well as overcome blind spots in suboptimal message-
passing algorithms (Pitkow et al. 2011).
The result of all of these circulating messages is that all 
evidence indirectly related to each variable is eventually 
consolidated in one place on the probabilistic graphical model, 
so any inferred variable can be read out directly (Raju and 
Pitkow 2016).
This is a broad family of algorithms, but not all-
encompassing. In particular, message-passing restricts direct 
information flow only along the graphical model: if two variables 
are conditionally independent according to the model, then they 
are not directly connected on the graph, and messages cannot 
flow directly between them. We and many others have 
hypothesized that the brain uses some version of belief 
propagation (e.g. Lee and Mumford 2003; Raju and Pitkow 
2016), which specifies a functional form by which posterior 
parameters interact on a probabilistic graphical model. This 
message-passing algorithm performs exact inference on tree 
graphs, and often performs well even in other graphs. 
Nonetheless, belief propagation has inferential blind spots 
(Heinemann and Globerson 2011; Pitkow et al. 2011) that the 
brain must overcome. We speculate that the brain has its own 
clever version of message-passing that can compensate for 
such handicaps. It will be important to define families of 
message-passing algorithms from which to select good fits to 
neural recoding. In later sections we will describe an analysis 
framework that may help determine which probabilistic 
graphical models and message-passing algorithms best match 
the brain’s computations.
Decoding: Probabilistic control
The brain appears to use multiple strategies to map its 
beliefs onto actions, depending partly on the task structure and 
the animal’s ability to model it (Dolan and Dayan 2013). Two 
types of strategies are known as model-free control, in which 
an agent essentially builds a look-up table of likely rewards, 
and model-based control, in which an agent relies on an 
internal model of the world to predict future rewards.
In the latter case, choosing a good action can be formulated 
as an optimal control problem, where the animal aims to 
maximize expected utility based on its uncertain beliefs about 
the current and future latent variables (Sutton and Barto 1998). 
Maximizing utility thus involves building not only a model of the 
external world, but also a model of one’s own causal influence 
on it, as well as an explicit representation of uncertainty. 
Probabilistic inference should therefore play a major role in 
guiding action. This should make our theory of statistics flowing 
through redundant population codes especially useful for 
understanding neural computation all the way from encoding, 
through recoding, to decoding.
FROM THEORY TO EXPERIMENT
If our theory of neural computation is correct, how could we 
test it? We propose an analysis framework for quantifying how 
neural computat ion t ransforms informat ion at the 
representational level. This framework compares encoding, 
recoding and decoding between a behavioral model and the 
neural statistics that represent the corresponding quantities. 
We then argue that such a description is especially natural for 
redundant population codes. We conclude by advocating for 
more complex tasks that can expose the brain’s flexible 
computations, by including more uncertainty, latent variables, 
and nuisance variables.
Analyzing neural responses at the representational level
The fundamental reason that we can fruitfully model 
computation at the representational level is that information 
about any given relevant latent variables is distributed amongst 
many neurons in the brain. We must therefore think about the 
basic properties of these neural populations.
In conventional population codes, the relevant signal is 
shared by many neurons. By combining neural responses, the 
brain can then average away noise. In redundant population 
codes, in contrast, the noise is shared as well. Specifically, the 
noise fluctuates in some patterns that are indistinguishable 
from the signal pattern across the population. These are 
‘information-limiting correlations’ (Zohary et al. 1994; Moreno-
Bote et al. 2014; Pitkow et al. 2015). The brain cannot average 
away this noise.
The disadvantage of a redundant population code is that 
such a neural representation encodes a limited amount of 
information, whether about estimates of latent variables or a 
posterior distribution over them. This information limit arises 
originally at the sensory input itself (Kanitscheider et al. 2015): 
once signals enter the brain, the neural representation expands 
massively, engaging many times more neurons than sensory 
receptors. Yet despite the large increase in the number of 
neurons, the brain cannot encode more information than it 
receives. So as long as all of these extra neurons are not just 
remembering the past (Ganguli et al. 2008), then they can at 
best recode the relevant signals in a new form, and may lose 
information due to biological constraints or suboptimal 
computation (Beck et al. 2012; Babadi and Sompolinsky 2014).
The advantage of a redundant population code is that 
multiple copies of essentially the same information exist in the 
network activity patterns. Decoding these patterns in many 
different ways therefore can produce similar outcomes (Pitkow 
et al. 2015), providing a measure of robustness to neural 
computation.
Since neural networks can implement computationally 
useful transformations in multiple ways, we should therefore 
focus on the shared properties of equivalent computations. It 
may not even be possible to identify the fine-scale structure of 
neural interactions based on reasonable amounts of data 
(Haefner et al. 2013). A focus on the coarse-scale properties 
should abstract away the fine implementation details while 
preserving essential properties of the nonlinear computation 
(Yang and Pitkow 2015; Lakshminarasimhan et al. 2017). 
(Marder and Taylor 2011) similarly advocate for considering 
equivalent classes of low-level biological mechanisms for a 
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given circuit function, since neural circuits are degenerate and 
robust even down to the level of ion channel distributions.
The essential encoding properties comprise those statistics 
of the stimulus that are informative about a task, and the 
essential recoding transformations are determined by the 
nonlinear functions needed to untangle the nuisance variables. 
For example, an energy-based model for phase-invariant 
orientation selectivity would have quadratic computations as an 
essential property (Figure 2D). This quadratic computation can 
be performed in two equivalent ways: squaring neural 
responses directly, or summing a set of rectifiers with uniformly 
spaced thresholds (Figure 2E).
These quadratic and rectified computations are equivalent 
not only for transforming the signal, but also for transforming 
the noise that enters with the signal, particularly the 
information-limiting fluctuations that look indistinguishable from 
changes in the signal. In redundant codes, this type of noise 
can dominate the performance, even with suboptimal decoding 
(Pitkow et al. 2015). In this case, the remaining noise patterns 
could be averaged away by appropriate fine-scale weighting, 
but there is little benefit for the brain since the performance is 
limited by the redundancy. Inferring the actual fine-scale 
weighting pattern is therefore inconsequential compared to 
inferring the coarse-scale transformations that determine the 
information.
Here is one caveat, however: Although we extol the virtues 
of abstracting away from individual neuronal nonlinear 
mechanisms, nonetheless there may be certain functions that 
are difficult to implement as a combination of generic 
nonlinearities. For instance, both a quadratic nonlinearity and 
divisive normalization can be implemented as a sum of 
sigmoidally transformed inputs, but the latter requires a much 
larger number of neurons (Raju and Pitkow 2015). We 
speculate that cell types are hard-wired with specialized 
connectivity (Kim et al. 2014; Jiang et al. 2015) in order to 
accomplish useful operations, like divisive normalization, that 
are harder to learn by adjusting synapses between arbitrarily 
connected neurons.
Messages, summary statistics, and neural responses
Mathematically, message-passing algorithms operate on 
parameters of the graphical model. Yet in any practical 
implementation on a digital computer, the algorithms operate on 
elements — binary strings — that represent the underlying 
parameters. In our brain model, the corresponding elements 
are the spikes. The best way to understand machine 
computation may not be to examine the transformation of 
individual bits (Jonas and Körding 2017), but to look instead at 
the transformation of the variables those bits encode. Likewise, 
in the brain, we propose that it is more fundamental to describe 
the nonlinear transformation of encoded variables than to 
describe the detailed nonlinear response properties of 
individual neurons (Yang and Pitkow 2015; Raju and Pitkow 
2016). The two nonlinearities may be related, but need not be, 
as we saw in Figure 2E.
Summary statistics provide a bridge between the 
representational and neural implementation levels. These 
statistics are functions of the neural activity that encode the 
posterior parameters. The updates to the posterior parameters 
define the algorithmic-level message-passing algorithm. The 
updates to the neural activity define a lower-level 
implementation, and will generally include activity patterns that 
are irrelevant to the computation. The updates to the summary 
statistics define the evolution of the subset of neural activity 
that actually represents the posterior parameters. It is these 
statistics that we describe in the article title as flowing in 
population codes (Figure 1).
Behavioral modeling to estimate latent variables
We expect that much of the brain's cortical machinery is 
dedicated to attributing dynamic latent causes to observations, 
and using them to choose appropriate actions. To understand 
this process, we need some experimental handle on the latent 
variables we expect the brain represents and transforms. 
Inferring latent variables requires perceptual models, and we 
measure an animal’s percepts through its behavior, so we need 
behavioral models. We call attention to two types here.
The first behavioral model is a black box, such as an 
artificial recurrent neural network trained on a task. One can 
compare then the internal structure of the artificial network 
activity to the structure of real brain activity. If representational 
similarity (Kriegeskorte et al. 2008) between them suggests that 
the solutions are similar, one can then analyze the fully-
observable artificial machinery to gain some insights into neural 
computation. This approach has been used fruitfully by (Mante 
et al. 2013; Yamins et al. 2014). However, such models are 
difficult to interpret without some external guess about the 
relevant latent variables and how they influence each other. 
This has been a persistent challenge even in artificial deep 
networks where we have arbitrary introspective power (Zeiler 
and Fergus 2014). In simple tasks, the relevant latent variables 
may be intuitively obvious. But in complex tasks we may not 
know how to interpret the computation beyond the similarity to 
the artificial network (Yamins et al. 2014), which makes it hard 
to understand and generalize. Ultimately, we need some 
principled way to characterize the latent variables.
This leads us to the second type of behavioral model: 
optimal control. Such a model uses probabilistic inference to 
identify the state of time-varying latent variables, their 
interactions, and the actions that maximize expected value. 
Clearly, animals are not globally optimal. Nonetheless, for some 
tasks, animals may understand the structure of the task, while 
mis-estimating its parameters and performing inference that is 
only approximate. Consequently, we can use the optimal 
structure to direct our search for computational features in 
neural networks, and fit the model parameters to best explain 
the actions we observe as based on evidence the animal 
observes. Fitting such a model is solving an inverse control 
problem (Ng and Russell 2000; Daunizeau et al 2010).
Comparing behavioral and neural models
A good behavioral model of this type provides us not only 
with parameters of the animal’s internal model, but also with 
dynamic estimates of its beliefs and uncertainties about latent 
variables (Daw et al 2006; Kira et al. 2015) that evolve over 
time, perhaps through a message-passing inference algorithm. 
We can then examine how neuronal activity encodes these 
estimates at each time. The encodings can be fit by targeted 
dimensionality reduction methods ranging in complexity from 
linear regression to nonlinear neural networks. Once this 
Journal
Perspective
 8
encoding is fixed, we can estimate the agent’s beliefs in two 
ways: one from the behavioral model, and one from the neural 
activity. Of course our estimates about the animal’s estimates 
will be uncertain, and we will even have uncertainty about the 
animal’s uncertainty. But if, up to an appropriate statistical 
confidence, we find agreement between these neurally derived 
quantities and those derived from the behavioral model, then 
this provides support that we have captured the encoding of 
statistics.
With an estimate of the neural encoding in hand, we should 
then evaluate whether the neural recoding matches the 
inference dynamics produced by the behavioral model. Recall 
that for a message-passing algorithm, the recoding process is a 
dynamical system that iteratively updates parameters of the 
posterior distribution over latent variables. In a neural 
implementation of this algorithm, recoding iteratively updates 
the neural activity through the recurrent connections, and the 
crucial aspect of these dynamics is how the summary statistics 
are updated: those statistics determine the posterior, so their 
updates determine the inference.
To measure the recoding observed in the brain, we 
recommend fitting a nonlinear dynamical system to the neural 
data. However, such systems can be extremely flexible, and 
would be pitifully underconstrained when fit to raw neural 
activity patterns. Thus computational models will benefit 
enormously from the dimensionality reduction of considering 
dynamics only on summary statistics about the task, not for all 
neural activities. Even so, we need hypotheses to constrain the 
dynamics. The message-passing framework provides one such 
hypothesis, by assuming the existence of canonical dynamics 
that operates over all latent variables. These dynamics are 
parameterized by two sets of parameters: one global set that 
defines a family of message-passing algorithms, and one task-
specific set that specifies the graphical model over which the 
message-passing operates.
With a message-passing algorithm and underlying graphical 
model, both fit to explain the dynamics of neurally encoded 
summary statistics, we should then compare these sets of 
parameters between the behavioral and neurally derived 
models (on new data, of course). Agreement between these 
two recoding models is not guaranteed, even when the neural 
encoding was fit to the behavioral model. If the models 
disagree, then we can try to use the neurally-derived dynamics 
as a novel message-passing algorithm in the behavioral model. 
If we find agreement, then we have understood key aspects of 
neural recoding.
Once message-passing inference has localized probabilistic 
information to target variables, it can be used to select actions. 
But if an animal never guides any action by information in its 
neural populations, then it doesn’t matter that neurons encode 
that information, or even if the network happens to transform it 
the right way. Thus it is critical to measure neural decoding — 
that is, how neural representations relate to behavior. Ideally, 
we would like to predict variations in behavior from variations in 
neural activity, especially from variations in those statistics that 
encode task-relevant parameters. A behavioral model predicts 
how latent variables determine actions. We can therefore test 
whether the trial-by-trial variations in the neural summary 
statistics predict future actions. If so, then we would have made 
major progress in understanding neural decoding.
The schematic in Figure 3 summarizes this approach of 
using a behavioral model with identifiable latent variables to 
interpret neural activity. In essence, this novel unified analysis 
framework allows one to perform hypothesis testing at the 
representational level, a step removed from the neural 
mechanisms, to measure the encoding, recoding, and decoding 
algorithms of the brain.
Task design to reveal flexible probabilistic computation
Flexible, probabilistic nonlinear computation can best be 
revealed in concrete naturalistic tasks with interesting 
interactions. However, truly natural stimuli are too complex, and 
too filled with uncontrolled and indescribable nuisance 
variations, to make good computational theories (Rust and 
Movshon 2005). On the other hand, tasks should not be too 
simple, or else we won’t be able to identify the computations. 
For a simple example, we saw in Figure 2D that the 
computations needed to infer angles were qualitatively different 
in the presence of nuisance variation, a more natural condition 
than many laboratory experiments. We want to understand the 
remarkable properties of the brain — especially those aspects 
that still go far beyond the piecewise-linear fitting of 
(impressively successful) deep networks (Krizhevsky et al. 
2012). This means we need to challenge it to be flexible, to 
adjust processing dynamically. This requires us to find a happy 
medium: tasks that are neither too easy nor too hard.
algorithm
(behavior)
implementation
(brain)
Variables Variables
message-
passing
dynamics
control
model
nonlinear
dynamics
fit by targeted
dimensionality reduction
encoding
if these agree
then we understand
recoding
if these agree
then we understand
decoding
choice-related
activity
Interactions
Actions
Interactions
Actions
Figure 3. Schematic for understanding distributed codes
This figure sketches how behavioral models (left) that predict latent 
variables, interactions, and actions should be compared against neural 
representations of those same features (right). This comparison first 
finds a best-fit neural encoding of behaviorally relevant variables, and 
then checks whether the recoding and decoding based on those 
variables match between behavioral and neural models. The 
behavioral model defines latent variables needed for the task, and we 
measure the neural encoding by using targeted dimensionality 
reduction between neural activity and the latent variables (top). We 
quantify recoding of by the transformations of latent variables, and 
compare those transformations established by the behavioral model to 
the corresponding changes measured between the neural 
representations of those variables (middle row). Our favored model 
predicts that these interactions are described by a message-passing 
algorithm, which describes one particular class of transformations 
(Figure 1). Finally, we measure decoding by predicting actions, and 
compare predictions from the behavioral model and the corresponding 
neural representations (bottom row). A match between behavioral 
models and neural models, by measures like log-likelihood or variance 
explained, provides evidence that these models accurately reflect the 
encoding, recoding and decoding processes, and thus describe the 
core elements of neural computation.
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Newer elaborations of 2AFC tasks require the animal to 
choose between multiple subtasks (Cohen and Newsome 
2008; Mante et al 2013; Saez et al. 2015; Bondy and Cumming 
2016). These are promising directions, as they provide greater 
opportunities for experiments to reveal flexible neural 
computation by introducing latent context variables. These 
contexts serve as nuisance variables that must be disentangled 
through nonlinear computation to infer the rewarded task-
relevant variables. More nuisance variables will be better, but 
we should also be wary of natural tasks that are far too 
complex for us to understand (Rust and Movshon 2005).
To understand the richness of brain computations, the tasks 
we present to an animal should satisfy certain requirements. 
First, to understand nonlinear computations, one should include 
nuisance variables that the brain must untangle. Second, to 
reveal probabilistic inference, which hinges on appropriate 
treatment of uncertainty, one must manipulate uncertainty 
experimentally. Third, to expose an animal’s internal model, the 
task should require the animal to predict unseen variables, for 
otherwise the animal can rely upon visible evidence which can 
compensate for any false beliefs an animal might harbor. 
Fourth, the task should be naturalistic, but neither too easy nor 
too hard. This has the best chances of keeping the brain 
engaged and the animal incentivized. These virtues would 
address the problems arising from overly simple tasks and 
would help us refine our understanding of the neural basis of 
behavior.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed that the brain naturally performs 
approximate probabilistic inference, and critiqued overly simple 
tasks as being ill suited to expose the inferential computations 
that make the brain special. We introduced a hypothesis about 
computation in cortical circuits. Our hypothesis has three parts. 
First, overlapping patterns of population activity encode 
statistics that summarize both estimates and uncertainties 
about latent variables. Second, the brain specifies how those 
variables are related through a sparse probabilistic graphical 
model of the world. Third, recurrent circuitry implements a 
nonlinear message-passing algorithm that selects and localizes 
the brain's statistical summaries of latent variables, so that all 
task-relevant information is actionable.
Finally, we emphasized the advantage in studying the 
computation at the level of neural population activity, rather 
than at the level of single neurons or membrane potentials: If 
the brain does use redundant population codes, then many fine 
details of neural processing don’t matter for computation. 
Instead it can be beneficial to characterize computation at a 
more abstract representational level, operating on variables 
encoded by populations, rather than on the substrate.
Naturally, understanding the brain is difficult. Even with the 
torrents of data that may be collected in the near future, it will 
be challenging to build models that reflect meaningful neural 
computation. A model of approximate probabilistic inference 
operating at the representational level will be an invaluable 
abstraction.
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